The Story of the 34th Infantry Division
Book II • Pisa to Final Victory

Chapter XXIII • NEW YEAR
Patrolling [pp. 43-52]

   On 12 January [1945] the Division was ordered back to the front, to the sector east of Highway 85 and took up once again its task of patrolling and watching. Our knowledge of the enemy in the sector was meager in the extreme, for no identification had been obtained for some time. The only clue gained was that of four German corpses which had been identified as coming from the 305th Infantry Division. It was comparatively easy for the enemy to preserve the secret of his identity, for not only was the snow a foot deep everywhere, increasing in drifts to armpit level, but in addition there was a bright moon which made it possible for German sentries and observers to detect our every movement. Even where accidents of the ground gave our patrols concealment, noise of boots on the frozen surface of the snow gave away our approach long before we were within range to accomplish anything useful. The terrain favored the Germans, for the long tongues of land which lay between the little stream valleys feeding the Po River were ribbed with sheer bluffs, the steep side facing us, while the German side sloped gradually northward so as to give the effect of teeth on a rasp - making movement easy from north to south but difficult in the opposite direction. It followed that infantry work in these conditions was practicable only at certain points which were as well known to the enemy as to ourselves. By dogged perseverance and at the cost of disproportionately heavy casualties we finally were able to confirm the location of the 305th Infantry Division, which had been moved from the Eighth Army sector about a month previously, relieving the weary former occupants. It would be difficult to exaggerate the deadliness of the kind on warfare that went on at this time There was nothing spectacular in it, and possibly from the over-all point of view each little operation was of small account. Nevertheless, the fact that each approach to the German positions was covered by previously registered mortar concentrations and machine-gun defensive fires; the alertness of the enemy; the fact that we were carrying the fight to him all the time, allowing him to choose his own moment for bringing down fire; the excellent visibility in the crisp chill of the winter's night - all these factors combined to make this period one of the most difficult and wearing of any that the 34th Division had known. Moreover, our sector was of crucial importance. As part of their winter war of nerves, designed to prevent us from getting firmly set in our defenses, the Germans had for the past few weeks been making small raids on critical hill features. Occasionally they succeeded in capturing a prominent point which they at once put to use as an advanced observatory to harass and make miserable the already grim life of the forward areas. The enemy had his eye on M. Belmonte, which, had he been able to get it, would have given him a wonderful vantage point against us. It would also, in conjunction with the by-then-famous Gorgognano Church hill, have made a tremendously strong bastion to hold against the time when the Allies attacked again. Belmonte remained ours only at the price of unceasing alertness and sudden, bitter encounters.

   In the face of a practically blank wall of ignorance about the enemy, and the ever-present necessity of obtaining data about them in case they should try to spring a surprise upon us, we made a limited raid involving two battalions on the afternoon of 6 February, centering upon the steep bluff and the rocky outcrop at Pizzano. Broad daylight was chosen for this operation in order to take advantage of surprise, since it was known that the Germans, like ourselves, used to sleep during the day while they kept vigilant watch at night. With necessarily limited artillery support, our troops were stopped cold within the first few hundred yards. The enemy, holed up in the rocks and caves, were quite safe from all kinds of fire except direct head-on shooting with high-velocity weapons, and his excellent observation prevented us from moving up anti-tank guns or tank destroyers for this purpose. Only one way to drive out the Germans seemed possible - hand-to-hand fighting with bayonet and grenade. This game was not worth the candle, and we resumed our former defensive attitude. The Infantry Regiments were relieved shortly afterward and spent nearly a month in a training area at Calenzano preparing themselves for offensive operations. It was a strong policy of the Division that the current preoccupation with defense in all its forms should not lead to an attitude of stolidness, still less defeatism, among the troops, for it was clear to all who were able to take the larger view that the winter phase was merely transitory, and with the melting of the snow, it would give [way] to active offensive operations once more.

   It must be stated that in mountain warfare of this type, especially where communications are poor and equipment not specialized, road conditions are of paramount importance. Because of this, every effort had been made in the preceding months to restrict transportation to a minimum without prejudicing the conduct of operations. Thus, tank and tank destroyers which had been emplaced many weeks previously remained in their positions, only the crew being relieved from time to time. Field artillery battalions exchanged pieces with other units to avoid destroying the fragile road surface which was only maintained at the cost of exhaustion on the part of thousands of engineers and civilian laborers. There was another reason for keeping down the amount of traffic. The rough roads of the autumn months had taken a heavy toll in wear and tear on trucks, and the maintenance service was greatly overworked, hampered by the short supply of spare parts. Road accidents during the icy conditions which followed meant that our non-battle casualties were more numerous than those who fell in action. At Calenzano maintenance and repair was stressed as much as the physical training of the troops.

   The 34th Division returned to the line, this time on and west of Highway 65, during the first week of March, taking over positions in front of those insignificant but highly dangerous places - Ca Valla, Monterumici, and Zula. We did not know very well the enemy troops who opposed us, but it was certain that the eastern half of our sector was held by the 65th Infantry Division, and that a newly organized and good-quality formation, the 8th Mountain Division, confronted us on the western side. So once more, as melting snows raised the level of water in the streams and turned ice into mud on the roads, the 34th Division resumed the deadly, nightly job of probing and patrolling under conditions where an alert but passive enemy had things mostly his own way. However, by this stage, the Division Staff had been advised that the information obtained was not merely for the preparation of our defense, but would be used for the much more serious job of planning the resumption of the Allied offensive. Information obtained by the patrols, carefully stored and checked, became the basis upon which the troops who did eventually attack could plan ahead and, by using their knowledge, minimize their own losses. In order that it shall not be said that the enemy was at this stage already agreeable to give in, let it be admitted that on three successive nights between 15 and 19 March the German mountain troops scored clear-cut successes over our infantry in a series of patrol encounters in the valley and among the caves at Ca Valla, when our patrols were ambushed and captured by the Germans at no cost to themselves.

   A few days later in the sector further east, an attack with less than a battalion of the 168th Infantry took place with the object of penetrating to the crescent-shaped ridge of Monterumici, to test the enemy defenses and the state of their alertness. As had been the case at Pizzano, daylight was again chosen for the assault, this time shortly after dawn. Our attacking forces very nearly reached the rim of the escarpment, having very thoroughly silenced the first German mortar barrage by means of our own effective counter-mortar organization. However, the Germans rapidly shifted their weapons to alternate sites and after a silence of half an hour laid down heavy mortar fire on all draws in the area leading to their positions. Fortunately, we had chosen to use the ridge lines for our approach and casualties were light. It was deemed prudent to withdraw under cover of smoke and artillery fire, lest our troops be caught in the German barrage when the enemy became alive to the situation.

   The season had now changed from winter to early spring and as each day passed, the time approached for the beginning of the Allied offensive which was destined not merely to complete the operation which had dragged to a halt nearly six months previously, but was to destroy the German forces in all Italy. During the long months, and aided by the restriction upon traffic, the engineers had diligently labored on the roads and trails, in places creating entirely new highways, until the surfaces were hard and smooth enough to take the immense burden of vehicles which would be imposed upon them by the coming operation. Successive convoys arriving in the base ports had discharged their loads of supplies and ammunition, to be laboriously hauled to dumps in the immediate rear of the front, eliminating decisively the shortage which had been the primary cause of our failure in the preceding fall.

   During the early part of April the Division Staff received the word to begin plans for the attack, and the complicated series of reliefs began which were to culminate with the 34th taking over command of the sector east of Highway 65 where it was to launch its part of the offensive a little later on.

Chapter XXII YEAR'S END Defending	Chapter XXIV BOLOGNA Smashing
Return to the beginning, The Story of the 34th Infantry Division Introduction, Foreword, Contents

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