The Story of the 34th Infantry Division
Book II • Pisa to Final Victory

Chapter XX • FLORENCE - MONZUNO
Assaulting [pp. 17-30]

   On 9 September [1944] the Division entered the line on the left of the II Corps sector, relieving British troops north of Florence. The mission was to advance alone and to the east of the Vernio-Bologna road, screening the Corps left flank and assisting the 91st Infantry Division on our right in their major task of capturing the Futa Pass and piercing the Gothic Line. On the left of the 34th, the 6th South African Armored Division was to advance and occupy ground as it was vacated by the enemy and was to screen our left, but the plan did not call for the South Africans to take part in the all-out attack. In general, the Gothic Line seemed likely to be rather less formidable in the 34th's sector than it was in the Futa Pass area. There was no antitank ditch, fewer concrete pillboxes and sunken tank turrets; probably more important still, the caliber of the troops of the 334th Infantry Division, who opposed us in the left half of our sector, was not nearly so high as that of the tough soldiers of the 4th Parachute Division who defended the Futa Pass and the right half of the 34th's zone. On the other hand, the terrain was extremely rugged in the path of our advance, and the road not of the most primitive type. The German High Command had expressly warned its lower units not to rely merely on difficult country to act as a defense against Allied attacks. French and American troops had taught the enemy this lesson in the offensive of the previous May. In spite of the good counsel, the enemy seemed to have left a slight gap in his defenses about half way between the Vernio road and Highway 65, at the place where the mountains were most steep and jagged. The 34th noted this for future reference.

   For several days prior to their relief by our troops, British units had been advancing rapidly, against negligible resistance, from the northern outskirts of Florence toward the foothills of the Apennines. The Germans, feeling the pinch in manpower, had clearly decided not to become involved in heavy fighting before they had retired into the protection of their defensive line. The enemy units, falling back methodically from phase-line to phase-line, kept watch on our movements and harassed us liberally with self-propelled and long-range artillery.

   The countryside just north of Florence is rich and heavily cultivated. In fine, warm weather the 34th forged ahead rapidly, with reconnaissance pushed well forward and both flanks screened by mechanized cavalry from the 91st Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron and the 34th Cavalry Reconnaissance Troop. By 11 September, the 168th Infantry on the right of the Division sector had cleared the towns of Cavallina and Barberino, while the 133rd Infantry on the left was well up alongside them. Enemy resistance remained very light, but demolitions, a few minefields, and harassing artillery fire slowed our progress a little. It was not until 13 September that the enemy outpost line was reached, by which time the 135th Infantry, having passed through the 168th, was the right flank regiment of the Division. The next few days saw stiff fighting as the enemy was driven out of his positions. Although the Germans had not built a continuous chain of fortifications at this point, all key hill features were well organized, and determined groups of enemy with automatic weapons infiltrated at night back to places from which they had been driven in daylight. In the face of many small counterattacks the 34th Division penetrated the enemy outpost line by 15 September and began the development of the road to Bologna, to the north and east in an arc which took advantage of every feature of the terrain. Although the main watershed of the Apennines was several kilometers further to the north, the mountain range was broken up by tongues of high ground, bare, rocky, and jagged, which ran south, splitting the area into many valleys, each dominated on both sides by hills. In order not to be caught under direct observed fire in the low ground, our advance had to be made laboriously over the ridge lines, where the best approaches were barely passable for mules, and where soldiers' backs formed the only means of getting forward supplies.

   Our penetration of the outpost line had placed us very near the main defenses near Vernio and here the Germans fought savagely to prevent our further progress. Further to the east, our advance was more rapid, for the enemy had more room at his back before occupying his long-prepared bunkers. But here also were the first signs of a German weakness. It had already been noted that a narrow gap in the fortifications existed in some extremely difficult hills which the enemy may have thought strong enough to stop us, even unsupported by troops. It had since become clear from enemy prisoners of war and captured documents that the boundary between the 334th Infantry Division and the 4th Parachute Division also fell at this point. The German army group commander had issued warnings to his troops not to neglect the defense of unit boundaries, yet in spite of his foresight it began to look as though the enemy had committed the double error of exaggerating the defensive strength of difficult country undefended by troops and of failing to protect a divisional boundary.

   Accordingly the 135th Infantry pushed due north leaving the threat to its flank to be taken care of by the 133rd Infantry which was heavily engaged with the 334th Division northeast of Vernio. The Germans had evidently decided that the only way in which they could obtain any immunity from the heavy concentrations of American artillery fire was by resorting to continual hand-to-hand combat since they realized we would then have to lift our fire to avoid casualties to our own troops. The repeated counterattacks which the enemy launched were therefore supported not only by the normal methods of artillery and mortar fire but also by the most lavish use of hand grenades seen since Cassino. One counterattack in particular, involving merely a platoon of enemy, was made with the support of about 200 men who, from a nearby hill, threw a veritable barrage of several hundred grenades just in advance of their own soldiers. It was evident that the commander of the 334th Division was very concerned with preventing our reaching the Vernio road and was devoting most of his strength to that sector. Inevitably, a gap opened up between his division and the parachute division. By 19 September the 135th Infantry, after a morning of heavy fighting during which only slight advances were achieved, jumped off again at dusk and before midnight had succeeded in placing two companies onto the tops of hills between the two enemy divisions. Meanwhile, the German counterattacks on the left flank against the 133rd Infantry continued to be very severe, centering alone the dominating feature of Hill 810, which changed hands several times. After one particularly heavy counterattack the Germans managed to regain possession of the hill for a complete day, but the effort cost them dear; under unceasing American artillery fire on their positions and on their lines of supply, their position became untenable. The temporary success may have encouraged the rest of the Germans for the time being, for they fought with great determination. But the strain was beginning to tell - enemy units were broken up and shifted about to provide reinforcements for the critical sectors, even engineers being committed as infantry.

   By 19 September the Germans' exhaustion had forced them to abandon further local counterattacks and to content themselves with resisting passively along a line which included only the northern part of their defense belt. In the gap between the 334th and 4th Parachute Divisions, our initial infiltration was detected, and although the enemy was unable to do much to strengthen his position there, he used his observation from neighboring heights to bring down mortar fire and artillery concentrations on any injudicious movement of ours.

   Our pressure achieved its objective two days later. After shattering days and nights of constant mortar and artillery fire, the enemy on Hill 810, disorganized and completely cut off from his battle group headquarters, made an organized surrender. The remainder of the Gothic Line in our sector was completely overrun and the enemy, still nervous about the boundary with the 4th Parachute Division, began to retreat from ridge-line to ridge-line. Local enemy defensive actions remained stubborn, but it was evident that the central organization was lacking, due primarily to the very effective interdiction of enemy communication and supply lines by the Division Artillery, supported by the British 10th AGRA {Army Group Royal Artillery]. During the entire Gothic Line battle, enemy artillery fire had been heavy, indeed. For many months he had been saving his ammunition for the show-down. Still, on 23 September German howitzer fire fell off abruptly while self-propelled fire greatly increased in proportion, indicative of a policy which the Germans invariably followed when they were withdrawing their field batteries to new positions. The 34th Division pressed its advance on the next day, with air observation confirming the fact that the Germans were withdrawing steadily. Our troops intensified their pressure along the craggy difficult ridges.

   During the day and night of 24 September the little village of Montepiano, on the road 7 kilometers north of Vernio, was subjected to one of the heaviest German artillery concentrations of the entire campaign, when a total of over a thousand heavy shells fell within its narrow confines. The intensity of the fire may have been due in part to the enemy's wish to use up all the ammunition he could not carry away, but it seems probable that the Germans were completely deceived about the direction of our main attack. For, while it may have appeared to him simpler for us to follow the Vernio road, it turned out to be much quicker and safer to accept the difficulties of the terrain and to continue to advance northward along the ridge lines. On the same day the disorganized enemy battle groups that were conducting the delaying action were stabilized by a fresh battalion from the 362nd Infantry Division, which it took the remainder of the day to neutralize. We maintained a steady advance in the hills and along the trails, opposed by opportunist resistance from hastily chosen hill features supported by artillery fire of all types.

   Up till now the weather had definitely been favorable to the attackers, but on the evening of 27 September rain clouds gathered and there was every indication of a break. Enemy movements and small concentrations throughout daylight on 26 and 27 September had been picked up by air OPs, and on the evening of 27 September the enemy laid a smoke screen across our entire front. Throughout the next 24 hours it poured constantly, reducing visibility to nil and so affecting road communication that our troops came almost to a standstill. German artillery increased in intensity and it became a certainty that a considerable reshuffling of German forces was underway. The engineers, who already were overworked in making by-passes on the few trails that were possible for motor transportation and in maintaining the crumbling road surfaces, now found an even greater burden thrust suddenly upon then. Roads and trails became quagmires of greasy mud as the rain and dust were churned up by the passing vehicles. Flash floods washed out fords and strained make-shift bridges. Movement even by foot troops over steep surfaces made slippery by the down-pour was a slow and difficult business. The enemy, under cover of the natural screen, broke contact completely and disappeared into the fog. The weather cleared on the morning of 29 September, but close infantry contact was not regained until 30 September, by which time the enemy, by dint of immense exertions, had again completely organized and stabilized his defenses.

   The exhausted 334th Infantry Division was completely relieved by the fresh, well-equipped 16th SS Division, a formation which had suffered defeat at the hands of the 34th in the fighting for Leghorn but which had been completely refitted and rested in a quiet sector of the line since the Arno phase-line was reached. The new-comers, in addition to digging in machine guns and mortars, had laid a large minefield in front of their positions across practically the entire sector, and a reconnaissance battalion was brought into the line to help fill the gap between the SS men and the parachutists on their eastern flank. Notwithstanding the fresh enemy troops and our own fatigue, the 34th Division resumed its slow but steady progress, driving the Germans from hill to hill in the face of heavy enemy artillery fire and well-handled machine gun and mortar defenses.

   By 4 October our attack had reached the lateral secondary road connecting Highway 65 at Loiano with the village of Monzuno. Much of the 34th's supplies had to be bounced along tracks by jeep or mule since there was almost a complete absence of motorable roads in the sector. On each occasion that a temporary change in direction of attack of one of the regiments took place, a completely new main supply route had to be found, since there were no connecting trails between the various regiments' roads. On no less than three occasions, dumps and service installations were shifted to new MRSs serving the bulk of the Division. The Vernio-Bologna road (which was fairly suitable to heavy traffic even in wet weather) provided hazards of a different kind, for the successful advance of the 34th Division had placed them ahead of the other units in the Corps, and had resulted in our left flank being opened for a considerable length to direct enemy observation and fire. Supplies and ammunition for a complete regimental combat team were infiltrated by truck along this exposed route although enemy artillery interdiction was heavy and accurate. Our own Division Artillery, reinforced by the British 10th AGRA, did good work in neutralizing many enemy batteries, but the fact that the British guns were obliged by their weight and lack of maneuverability to remain in the valley only a few yards from the road meant that the Germans were able to retaliate with counter-battery and interdictory fire at one and the same time.

   The Germans had found the Monzuno road extremely useful and opposed our approach with great bitterness. Finally, as the enemy tired and as a threat of American break-through several miles to the east diverted the enemy's attention, the opposition to the 34th crumbled and our troops entered the town of Monzuno against weakening resistance, although the enemy threw a great weight of artillery fire into the town after we had occupied it. As we moved ahead it appeared that the 34th Division had scored a definite tactical success. Fatigued though we were, the enemy disorganization was so great as to make it likely that one further concerted push would see a complete penetration of the German force. In particular, across the river which paralleled the Vernio road northward to Bologna, a single rampart known as M. Sole, the dominating feature of the area, was thought to be held only lightly, according to patrols which had worked up toward it. The hill was in the sector of the division of our left, but if we could capture it, not only would the enemy's observation and interdiction of the Vernio road be reduced virtually to nothing, but the way would be open to exploitation with mobile forces of this, one of the two major routes of access to Bologna and the plain beyond. But the bigger plan envisioned a break-through to the east of Highway 65, and in order to maintain the momentum of the Corps offensive at this point, higher headquarters ordered infantry of the 1st Armored Division to relieve the 34th of their mission on the Corps left flank, freeing the 34th for commitment several thousand yards further east alongside the shattered ruins of Loiano where they took over the sector of the 85th Division on 14 October.

Chapter XIX GOTHIC LINE Considering	Chapter XXI BELMONTE Dragging
Return to the beginning, The Story of the 34th Infantry Division Introduction, Foreword, Contents

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