The Story of the 34th Infantry Division
|
![]() |
34th Inf Div Assn
History
34InfDiv,Chap10 |
SiteMap Change History Searches Message Board |
Chapter X VOLTURNO SpanningThe [Volturno River] formed the first large obstacle which the Germans had decided to defend since the breakout from the beachhead. In the 34th Division sector, which was nearly 15 kilometers wide, the stream was swift and in some places deep enough to cover a man's head, with steep banks overgrown with shrubbery. Immediately upon taking over the sector very active patrolling was begun in order to discover the best places to cross, the easiest bridge sites, and the location of enemy defenses. Patrols of a few men crossed the stream repeatedly to feel out the German positions; careful study was made of aerial photographs, and intelligence officers, by noting the direction of German tracer fire, were able to draw a quite complete and accurate picture of the German fire plan. While this was going on supplies of bridging equipment, artillery ammunition, and fuel were brought up in convoy after convoy. Surprise, if we could achieve it, would be decisive. Therefore all traffic near the river had to be squeezed into the hours of darkness, and so large were the movements that only superb traffic control prevented jams that might well have given away our whole plan. The direction and density of the traffic was so well worked-out and so faultlessly coordinated by the Division MPs that the operation is, even today, constantly cited as a model of good practice. By evening 12 October [1943], like a tightly coiled spring, the Division was ready to snap into action. As a result of the careful preparations the crossing was made rapidly and achieved great surprise. Preceded by an accurate artillery preparation the initial objective consisting of the high ground on the northern bank was reached, and the work of getting across supporting heavy weapons and supplies began. The Germans used their artillery and mortars vigorously to try to prevent our engineers from constructing the bridges and ferries necessary to support the combat troops. Yet, in spite of intense shelling which repeatedly punctured the inflated rubber pontons, a treadway bridge was in operation on the day following the initial crossing. The infantry had advanced and had captured, in the face of heavy machine-gun fire, the series of hills less than 2000 yards north of the stream, and as soon as the supply line across the river was in service the advance began resolutely to take the town of Caiazzo, thus cutting the lateral highway which the Germans had been using to bring reserves to the threatened sector. Pushing rapidly north, across country in which there were very few and difficult roads, where cover was hard to obtain, and in the face of very strong opposition from infantry and armor, our troops reached Alvignano, eight miles north of the river, by 17 October. The enemy during this phase consisted of the 3rd Panzer Grenadier Division, a unit which included in its ranks many seasoned veterans from the Russian front. In those days the Germans had ample equipment of excellent quality including a number of Mark IV tanks; however, such had been the pressure which our troops had put upon them that prisoners confessed that their ranks were seriously depleted and their troops short of food and sleep due to the remorseless hammering of our artillery which continued by day and night. Alvignano was occupied without resistance and pushing on, the village of Dragoni was taken by assault on 19 October by the 168th Infantry. By this time, our troops were again on the Volturno River, for the stream here was flowing almost at right angles to the direction it had at the point where our first crossing was made. At the hamlet of Marguerita, northeast of Dragoni, the river was spanned by a bridge which the Germans had not yet blown. A spirited effort by the 133rd Infantry, which had relieved the 168th Infantry, to capture this bridge intact had almost succeeded, but in spite of this failure our advance continued without pause, capturing the crossroads of Alife. Here the Division was ordered to turn northwest and advance along the ridges north of the river valley to Capriati. Still the Volturno lay ahead of our advance. Changing direction abruptly, it now challenged us for the third time. The problem promised to be difficult. The river at this point ran in a wide shallow bed, with many small islands of shingle and sand. The valley in which the stream flowed was from four to six miles wide and perfectly flat, with straight mountains springing up from the edge of the valley floor both on our side and on the Germans'. The lowlands were planted with olive trees and vineyards, whose long rows of wire, used for training the vines, canalized movement considerably. On the farther side, the slopes of the mountains were terraced, each step being about six feet high and buttressed with a stone wall. Very few trails existed and it was easy to see how difficult it would be to transport heavy weapons and supplies by mule or, more likely, by men, up the steep face of the mountain. The only cover for such operations was from the scrubby olive trees which grew on the terraces (their value for concealment is not great) or from one or two draws which carried off the rainwater from the hills. All these difficulties could be seen - from maps, photographs or from OPs [Observation Posts] on the ground itself. But even greater dangers were unseen and would come from the Germans. Ever since the failure of their attempt to smash the Salerno landings, the enemy High Command had decided upon the defense of a Winter Line - so strong, so well-stocked, so cunningly fitted out, that the Allies would remain stalled throughout the foul weather of a winter in the mountains. In various ways, the Allies had discovered not only that the Winter Line ran through Cassino, but that a very strong series of delaying lines began in the heights overlooking the west side of the upper Volturno valley and the town of Venafro. The knowledge that the third crossing of the Volturno would see the start of the attack on the main enemy position stimulated the Division to exert its best efforts and to neglect no precautions to make the coming operation a success. During the last three days of October the enemy had virtually broken contact, leaving us in undisputed control of the eastern bank of the river. For the next three days the 34th Division carried out intensive reconnaissance for river crossings and to seek out the enemy defenses. Certain captured documents removed from prisoners of war helped us to plot enemy minefields, but due to the width of the river and the expanse of flat terrain dominated by enemy observation it was very difficult for patrols to go far out or to obtain detailed locations. Consequently, when the assault across the river was launched at midnight on 3 November the troops who carried it out did so well realizing that a large number of unknown dangers lay ahead of them. The enemy did not contest very strongly the crossing of the river itself. However, on the western bank, extending through the vineyards and olive groves for a depth of as much as 1500 yards, the Germans had laid one of the biggest minefields that had been encountered in Italy up to this time. If our troops did not want to get caught in the flat land during daylight it was vital to reach the foothills before dawn. There was, therefore, no time for reconnaissance or for mine clearing operations. The assault battalions formed up in single file and walked clean through the minefields, the lead man clearing the path for the column which followed him. As soon as one man was hit, the man behind him would take his place. At fearful cost the lead company cleared the field and reached the western foothills. It was one of the most outstanding examples of discipline under fire that American troops had ever given. Throughout the entire march the night was punctuated by the flash of S-mines exploding and, alerted by the noise, the Germans sent up many flares and fired blindly into the flat ground, making even worse the difficulties of the passage. By dawn, however, our troops had established themselves in the vicinity of Pozzilli and had begun the steep climb into the mountains. Many enemy groups had been by-passed during this drive, but these were rounded up without great difficulty in the morning. It was now possible to get more detailed information on the defenses which the Germans had built as the outpost line for their winter positions. For six weeks, the engineers of their reserve units and the Organization Todt, using conscripted Italian labor, had blasted out of solid rock shelter positions which the Germans called bunkers. Each of these positions was connected to a machine gun or mortar location so that the enemy obtained relative immunity from our artillery barrage and could nearly always man his weapons in time to take our advancing infantry under murderous fire. One hill in particular proved difficult to take. This was a craggy promontory at the top of which the Italians, with a sure instinct for a safe place, had built the town of Roccaravindola. The sides of the hill contained beautifully camouflaged machine-gun nests and individual firing positions cut into the side of the rock with overhead cover provided by railroad ties covered with earth and foliage. These positions halted the entire advance until a platoon skillfully worked its way unobserved through the town itself and came upon the German positions from the rear. Completely surprised, the Germans surrendered after a brief struggle. The way north up the highway was now open and a task force, consisting mainly of the 135th Infantry supported by tanks and tank destroyers, moved rapidly up the road to capture the town of Montaquilla, also sited on the top of a steep hill commanding the entire valley beneath. The Germans were fully aware that this assault on their winter positions was a serious one. They did everything they could to stop it, not only by resisting our forward troops, but by desperate attempts to cut our supply line and starve out the assault. In addition, the enemy was helped by extremely bad weather. The autumn rains had begun and for days on end it poured constantly and the wind blew at gale force. Roads almost ceased to exist. The river which, when it was crossed, had been shallow, was now a raging torrent. The 109th Engineer Battalion, fully experienced in assault bridging, worked fiercely to keep roads open and the river spanned. Time and again the floods forced them to remove their pontons lest the entire structure be swept downstream. Yet nearly always within a matter of hours the bridge was built again and supplies and ammunition rolled across the valley and up the steep trails to the infantry. During this time of critical road conditions, traffic discipline became more than a matter of convenience and safety - it was a military necessity. The Division MPs, who had learned their job at the first Volturno crossing, brilliantly maintained their high standard. [Even] at the critical time when for three days the Division was virtually cut off from the rest of the Army by the direct route, essential traffic was kept moving over round-about roads. The German airforce, which in Africa had been so formidable as to require constant protection against it, but which since Salerno had remained very quiet, reasserted itself and reinforced the enemy harassing attacks against our artillery positions, bridges, and critical points along the roads. The German planes had very little success, however, except on one occasion when they were able to put out of action almost a complete battery of the 185th Field Artillery Battalion's medium howitzers.
|
||||||
|
Updated 2003 October 24.
Low in Fat No Frames No Cholesterol No Sounds |
|